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TORTS-INVASION OF PRIVACY:
NORTH DAKOTA DECLINES TO RECOGNIZE A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY
Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes
1998 N.D. 24; 574 N.W.2d 812
I. FACTS
On December 16, 1994, Daniel Hougum entered the Sears depart-
ment store in Grand Forks, North Dakota.' At the time, he was em-
ployed as a chaplain by Valley Memorial Homes, an elderly care facility
in Grand Forks.2 While at Sears, he entered the store's public restroom. 3
The restroom contained three enclosed stalls separated by metal parti-
tions, each with a locking metal door.4 The partitions did not extend all
the way to the floor, and as such, the feet and shins of the occupant of a
stall could be seen from the open area of the restroom. 5 Additionally,
there was a hole approximately one and a half inches in size drilled in
the partition separating the middle stall and the stall furthest from the
door. 6 Hougum entered the middle stall.7 According to his brief, he
"then decided to masturbate." 8
Shane Moran, an on-duty Sears loss prevention employee, was also
in the bathroom, using the stall furthest from the door. 9 While reaching
for toilet paper, Moran saw movement through the hole in the wall
between stalls. 10 He watched for roughly ten seconds and determined it
I. Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 1998 N.D. 24, 1, 574 N.w.2d 812, 812. According to
his brief, Hougum went to Sears for the purpose of purchasing towels, but did not find any that he
wanted. See Brief of Appellant at 3, Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 1998 N.D. 24, 574 N.W.2d
812 (No. 970108).
2. Hougum, 1,574 N.W.2d at 814.
3. Id. 1 2, 574 N.W.2d at 815.
4. Id.
5. Id. There were also narrow gaps between the door and frame for latches and hinges. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. 1 3; see also Brief of Appellant at 4, Hougum (No. 970108) (reviewing the facts of the
case and describing in detail the physical layout and contents of the Sears bathroom).
8. See Brief of Appellant at 4, Hougum (No. 970108). The brief does not explain why Hougum
masturbated; it simply notes, "[a]fter Pastor Hougum had relieved himself, he then decided to
masturbate." Id.
9. Hougum, 1 3, 574 N.W.2d at 815. In their brief, Sears and Moran noted that although Moran
was on duty, he entered the bathroom "for his own personal reasons and not as an undercover agent
for Sears." See Brief of Appellees at 3, Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 1998 N.D. 24, 574
N.W.2d 812 (No. 970108). However, the parties dispute the precise details of who entered the
bathroom first. Compare Brief of Appellant at 4-5, Hougum (No. 970108) (asserting that Hougum did
not remember anyone entering the bathroom after him) with Brief of Appellees at 3, Hougum (No.
970108) (claiming Moran thought he was alone in the bathroom when he noticed Hougum). The court
noted only that Moran claimed he thought no one else was in the bathroom. Hougum, 3, 574 N.w.2d
at 815.
10. Hougum, 3, 574 N.w.2d at 815.
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was an individual, later identified as Hougum, masturbating. 1 Moran
left the bathroom and called the Grand Forks Police Department.1 2 The
police arrived and told Moran that the sexual act he witnessed constituted
disorderly conduct.13 Moran executed a citizen's arrest form, and the
police arrested Hougum for disorderly conduct.14
Acting without counsel, Hougum pled guilty to the criminal disor-
derly conduct charge in Grand Forks municipal court on December 20,
1994.15 This plea was reported in the Grand Forks Herald. 16 Hougum
then retained counsel, and on January 6, 1995, he withdrew his guilty
plea. 17 The disorderly conduct charge was subsequently dismissed with
prejudice on January 25, 1995.18
Hougum subsequently filed a lawsuit against both Sears and Moran,
alleging invasion of privacy and both intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress.19 The invasion of privacy claim was based on the
"intrusion upon seclusion formula" set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts (1977).20 Both Sears and Moran moved for summary
judgment; the trial court granted their motions, and Hougum appealed to
the North Dakota Supreme Court. 2 1 The North Dakota Supreme Court
heard the case, and unanimously held that the trial court correctly
granted summary judgment because reasonable persons could not
11. Id.
12. Id. According to his brief, Moran was unsure of how to proceed in such a situation,
occasioning his call to the police. See Brief of Appellees at 4-5, Hougum (No. 970108).
13. Hougum, 4, 574 N.W.2d at 815.
14. Id. Hougum's brief noted that during the arrest he was handcuffed and driven to the police
station for processing. See Brief of Appellant at 5, Hougum (No. 970108).
15. Id. Hougum asserts that he initially pled guilty because he wanted to bring the situation to a
quick end, but he never believed that he had committed a crime. See Brief of Appellant at 5, Hougum
(No. 970108).
16. Hougum, 4, 574 N.W.2d at 815.
17. Id. Hougum retained William McKechnie of Grand Forks as his counsel; McKechnie also
represented Hougum during his lawsuit and subsequent appeal. See Brief of Appellant at 5, Hougum
(No. 970108).
18. Hougum, 4, 574 N.W.2d at 815.
19. Id. 1 6. After his arrest but before his plea was withdrawn, Valley Memorial Homes termi-
nated Hougum. Id. 5. Hougum named Valley Memorial Homes as a defendant in his suit, alleging
that its termination of him violated the North Dakota Human Rights Act. Id. 34, 574 N.W.2d at 820
(citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 (1997)). The claim was based on an allegation that Valley
Memorial Homes considered Hougum to be a homosexual. Id. The trial court dismissed the claim,
but the North Dakota Supreme Court remanded; at the time of publication, the case had not yet
proceeded to trial on remand. Id. 46, 574 N.W.2d at 822.
20. Id. 9, 574 N.W.2d at 816. "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
21. See Hougum, 1 6, 574 N.W.2d at 815. The trial judge issued a detailed memorandum
decision granting summary judgment, analyzing Hougum's claim and ultimately concluding, as the
North Dakota Supreme Court did, that his claim would fail on the merits if North Dakota were to
recognize invasion of privacy. See Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, Civil No. 96-981 (N.D. Dist.
Ct. Feb. 25, 1997) (mem.).
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conclude that the defendants' actions constituted an intentional intrusion
upon seclusion by a method objectionable to a reasonable person.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Unlike many torts, invasion of privacy did not develop from the
English common law. 22 Rather, it was created primarily by Samuel D.
Warren and Louis Brandeis, who in 1890 wrote an article in the Harvard
Law Review arguing for its recognition. 23 They asserted that while the
law once allowed recovery only for physical injuries, it later recognized
"man's spiritual nature ... his feelings and his intellect." 24  To accom-
modate this development, the law began allowing recovery for injuries
that were more difficult to define.25 For example, the protection against
physical injury provided by the tort of battery was extended to include
fear of injury, as seen in the tort of assault. 26 Warren and Brandeis
argued that a similar development had occurred in the conception of
property, such that intangible property, including intellectual property,
was now recognized and protected in a manner that once only applied to
real property. 27
According to Warren and Brandeis, such a progression was
inevitable. 28 The next step, they posited, was for the law to recognize a
right to privacy. 2 9 Their special concern was the unauthorized publica-
tion of photos and stories by an overzealous press.30 They stressed that
22. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193-95 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis] (reviewing the history of invasion of
privacy).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 193. This recognition of new legal rights, the authors argued, had gradually come to
encompass a broadening of the scope of the rights. Id.
25. Id. at 193-94.
26. See id. at 194. According to Warren and Brandeis, the principle that led from battery to
assault also led to nuisance, and eventually to actions protecting reputation and standing in the
community, such as libel and slander. Id.
27. Id. at 194-95.
28. See id. at 195. This progression was inevitable, they argued, because the heightened
emotional and intellectual life caused by the advance of civilization mandated new and more
sophisticated protections. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The genesis of the article was excessive newspaper coverage of the Warren family by
Boston newspapers, culminating in detailed coverage of the wedding of Warren's daughter. See
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser] (discussing the
Warren & Brandeis article). At the time he wrote the article, Warren had stopped practicing law and
was running his family's paper wholesaling business. Id. A representative of The Boston Globe once
thanked Warren for the high quality of the paper he was selling; Warren replied that it was "a damn
sight better than what you're giving us." See Louis M. LYONS, NEWSPAPER STORY: ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF THE BOSTON GLOBE 16 (1971). While the Saturday Evening Gazette, not the Globe, was the
paper responsible for the coverage of his daughter's wedding, this story well illustrates Warren's
attitude towards the press. Cf. id. (discussing Warren's connection with The Boston Globe around the
same time he and Brandeis wrote the influential law review article).
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the bustle of modem society has made tranquillity and privacy crucial. 31
However, rather than respecting the need for privacy, the press was
overstepping its bounds and fueling a desire for public scandal. 32 This,
they asserted, weakened society by feeding the weak side of human
nature and taking the place of more important concerns. 33
Warren and Brandeis' thesis depended on two bodies of decisions
which, though expressly decided on other grounds, the authors contend-
ed relied on an implicit recognition of the right of privacy. 34 In the first
line of cases, courts prevented the publication of various works on the
basis of intellectual property rights. 35 The second line extended similar
protections based on a breach of fiduciary duty. 36 In both cases, Warren
and Brandeis asserted that the decisions actually depended on the
implicit recognition of a right of privacy. 37
While discussing the first line of cases, Warren and Brandeis argue
that the law of intellectual property, which protects the right of an
individual to protect the publication aspect of his or her work, is only an
incident of the more general right "to be left alone." 38 Warren and
Brandeis focused on cases discussing an author's decision to publish in
the first instance. 39 Whether to publish at all is clearly an exclusive right
of the artist, and yet it cannot be strictly a property right, as there has
been no publication which would allow the property laws to control. 40
Therefore, they asserted that this right was derived from the right to
privacy. 41
31. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 196.
32. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 196. The authors described the climate thus:
"Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct proportion to
its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of morality." Id. This was the era of
"yellow journalism," when some newspapers used new techniques, such as bigger headlines, color
printing and pictures to "emphasize sensationalism at the expense of news." See generally EDwiN
EMERY & MICHAEL EMERY, THE PRESS AND AMERICA 281-82 (5th ed. 1984). It was also the height of
William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal, viewed as the epitome of yellow journalism. See id. at
285-95 (describing Hearst's work with the New York Journal). The Journal is remembered for
feeding the fires of the Cuban-American War with its coverage of the explosion of the Maine, a
United States battleship, in Havana, and asking, on its front page, "How do you like the Journal's
war?" Id. at 295.
33. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 196.
34. See Prosser, supra note 30, at 384 (summarizing Warren and Brandeis' methodology).
35. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 199-207.
36. Id. at 207-12.
37. See Prosser, supra note 30, at 384 (summarizing Warren & Brandeis' methodology).
38. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 205.
39. Id. at 200. For example, the authors discussed Prince Albert v. Strange, which prevented the
publication not only of etchings of Queen Victoria, which the author clearly could refuse, but also a
description of the etchings. Id. at 201-02 (discussing Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 DeGex & Sm. 652
(1849)).
40. Id. at 200-05.
41. Id. at 207. The authors describe this "as a part of the more general right to the immunity of
the person,-the right to one's personality." Id.
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In the second line of cases, courts granted injunctions to prevent
publication of a plaintiff's work, relying on an implied contract or trust
between the plaintiff and the one seeking to publish.42 Warren and
Brandeis, however, posited that the process of implying a trust or a term
in a contract was actually a declaration that public morality, private
justice, and general convenience demanded the result the courts
reached. 4 3  Thus, while contract theory may have provided an
appropriate way to resolve some cases, "[T]he court can hardly stop
there." 44  Instead, these decisions recognized the legal right of the
plaintiff in maintaining his or her right to privacy, which the authors
describe as a right to "an inviolate personality," and simply used
contract as a method of protecting that right. 45 Warren and Brandeis
argued that these lines of cases rested on an implicit privacy right, and
thus provided precedent for explicit recognition of a right to privacy. 46
Finally, they wrote that both damages and injunctions should be
available as remedies for invasions of privacy.4 7
There were varying reactions to the article, as a series of courts
considered and either rejected or embraced invasion of privacy as an
actionable tort.48 The first major case in this series was Atkinson v. John
E, Doherty & Co.,49 in which the Supreme Court of Michigan soundly
rejected the Warren and Brandeis theory.50 The defendant had produced
42. Id. at 207-12. For example, the authors discussed Abernathy v. Hutchinson, which prevented
publication of a professor's lectures. Id. at 207-08 (discussing Abernathy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J. Ch.
265 (1625)). Despite rejecting the argument that lectures were property, the court still found that
students admitted to hear lectures could record them only for their own purposes, and were thus
prevented from publishing them. Id.
43. Id. at 210.
44. id.
45. Id. at 210-11. The authors described this right as "the right of property in its widest sense,
including all possession including all rights and privileges, and hence embracing the right to an
inviolate personality." Id. at 211.
46. Id. at 213. Warren and Brandeis wrote:
We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, whatever their exact nature,
are not rights arising from contract or from special trust, but are rights as against the
world; and, as above stated, the principle which has been applied to protect these rights is
in reality not the principle of private property, unless that word be used in an extended
and unusual sense.
Id.
47. Id. at 219. The authors also discussed limitations on the right of privacy, both for the plaintiff
and defendant, which they drew largely from the law of libel and slander. Id. at 214-19. Warren and
Brandeis recognized six limitations: 1) privacy cannot prevent publication of newsworthy information;
2) the privileges of libel and slander apply to privacy torts; 3) recovering for oral publication requires
proof of special damages; 4) the right of privacy ceases with consent of the plaintiff or publication by
the plaintiff; 5) truth is not a defense; and 6) absence of malice is not a defense. Id. at 214-19.
48. See Prosser, supra note 30, at 385-86 (discussing the immediate impact of the Warren &
Brandeis article).
49. 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899)
50. Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 289 (Mich. 1899) (calling invasion of
privacy an ill for which the law affords no remedy).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:155
a cigar and without permission named it for Col. John Atkinson, a
well-known lawyer and politician. 51 His widow sought an injunction
preventing sale of the cigars, claiming both libel and invasion of
privacy. 52 The court rejected the privacy claim after discussing the
Warren and Brandeis article, taking issue with its characterization of
precedent as recognizing a right of privacy and rejecting its reasoning. 53
The next state to make important contributions to invasion of
privacy law was New York, when it too rejected Warren and Brandeis'
theory in Robberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.54 Defendants had
used an unauthorized picture of the plaintiff, a young woman, in an
advertisement for flour.55 The plaintiff sought to enjoin them from
distributing the advertisements and to recover damages. 56 Citing lack of
precedent and fear of vast and absurd litigation, the court rejected the
contention that relief could be afforded the plaintiff based on invasion
of privacy. 57 Like Atkinson, the Robberson decision considered and
rejected the Warren and Brandeis theory, specifically disagreeing that
any past decisions rested on an implicit right of privacy. 58 There was,
however, a strong dissent,59 and a year later the New York legislature
passed a statute making it both a misdemeanor and a tort to use an
51. Id. at 285. In addition to naming the cigar for Atkinson, the manufacturer sought to market
under the Atkinson name, using a picture of Col. Atkinson. Id.
52. Id. The court summarily disposed of the libel claim on the grounds that no one would think
less of Atkinson or his widow if cigars bearing his name were sold. Id.
53. Id. at 286-89. Judge Hooker, who wrote the Atkinson opinion, sharply criticized Warren and
Brandeis, especially their characterization of earlier cases as resting on privacy rights. Id. He wrote
at one point that Warren and Brandeis' theory was put forward "[n]otwithstanding the unanimity of
the courts in resting the decisions adverted to upon property rights." Id. at 286. He then reviewed the
cases himself, arguing throughout that they did in fact rest on property grounds, and not on a right of
privacy. Id. at 286-89.
54. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
55. Robberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 442 (N.Y. 1902). The plaintiff's
picture appeared on the package under the words "The Flour of the Family." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 443. The court also noted that the plaintiff could not recover based on libel had she
attempted to do so, as the "likeness is said to be a very good one." Id. at 442.
58. Id. at 444-45. The court wrote, "[E]ach decision was rested either upon the ground of breach
of trust, or that plaintiff had a property right in the subject of litigation which the court could protect."
Id. at 445. The decision also cited favorably from Atkinson. Id. at 447.
59. Id. at 448-51. Judge Gray argued passionately that the majority relied too heavily on lack of
precedent, and as a result failed to give plaintiff redress for the wrong committed against her. Id.
Judge Gray attacked the defendants, noting that though they argued the plaintiff had no cause of
action,
These defendants .... admi[t] they have made, published, and circulated, without the
knowledge or the authority of the plaintiff, 25,000 lithographic portraits of her, for the
purpose of profit and gain to themselves, that these portraits have been conspicuously
posted in stores, warehouses, and saloons in the vicinity of the plaintiff's residence, and
throughout the United States, as advertisements of their goods; that the effect has been to




unauthorized name or portrait for "advertising purposes or for the
purpose of trade." 60
After rejection in Michigan and mixed results in New York, invasion
of privacy was bolstered in 1905 when the Georgia Supreme Court
embraced it wholeheartedly in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. 6 1
In a long, detailed opinion, the Georgia court gave relief to a plaintiff
who, like the plaintiff in Robberson, sought to prevent the defendant
from using an unauthorized picture of him for advertising purposes. 62
The court based its decision in part on natural law and in part on an
analogy to the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches. 63
The Georgia Supreme Court became the first court to explicitly recog-
nize an actionable common-law protection against invasion of privacy.64
Courts that subsequently considered the issue followed either the
Georgia or the New York/Michigan analysis, leading to a wide variety of
decisions. 65 The next step in the development of the law was a 1960 law
review article by torts scholar William L. Prosser.66 At the time, Prosser
was able to identify twenty seven American jurisdictions which recog-
60. N.Y. Civ. RIGrrs LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1997). This law followed heavy public criticism
of the Robberson decision. See Prosser, supra note 30, at 385 (discussing the public and political
outcry in the aftermath of Robberson). The criticism was so severe it prompted one concurring justice
to write a law review article defending the decision. See Denis O'Brien, The Right to Privacy, 2
COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1902).
61. 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
62. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905). The New England Life
Insurance Company used a picture of Pavesich in an advertisement in the Atlanta Constitution. Id. at
68-69. The picture of Pavesich, who appeared healthy, was placed next to a picture of another man
who was ill-dressed and sickly. Id. The advertisement indicated that Pavesich had purchased life
insurance while the sick man had not; it quoted Pavesich as saying, "In my healthy and productive
period of life I bought insurance in the New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., of Boston, Mass., and
to-day my family is protected and I am drawing an annual dividend on my paid-up policies." Id. at 69.
The picture was used without Pavesich's permission, and he had never actually purchased insurance
from the defendant. Id.
63. Id. at 69-71. The court emphasized the role of natural law, writing, "The right of privacy has
its foundation in the instincts of nature. It is recognized intuitively, consciousness being the witness
that can be called to establish its existence." Id. at 69. The court also analogized to the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, which it wrote was an implicit recognition of the right of privacy.
Id. at 71-72.
64. See Prosser supra note 30, at 386. While the court discussed the merits of Pavesich's claim, it
framed the issue of the case as "whether an individual has a right of privacy which he can enforce,
and which the courts will protect against invasion." See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 69. In a recent criminal
case in which it overturned a criminal sodomy conviction on the grounds that the privacy of the
accused was invaded, the Supreme Court of Georgia noted its place as the first court to recognize the
general principle of invasion of privacy: "The Pavesich decision constituted the first time any court of
last resort in this country recognized the right of privacy, making this Court a pioneer in the realm of
the right of privacy." Powell v. The State, No. $98A0755, 1998 WL 804568, at *2. The court also
pointed out that in previous cases it had "proudly noted that the right of privacy 'was birthed by this
court."' See id. (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 200 S.E.2d. 127 (1973)).
65. Prosser, supra note 30, at 386 (discussing the effect of the Pavesich decision on courts which
considered the invasion of privacy question).
66. See generally id.
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nized an invasion of privacy tort in some form or another. 67 Prosser
emphasized that the term "invasion of privacy" should be understood
to encompass four distinct causes of action: 1) intrusion upon seclusion
or solitude, or into private affairs; 2) public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts; 3) false light publicity; and 4) appropriation of name or
likeness. 68 Prosser also identified limitations and defenses to the tort,
chiefly consent and the privileges of libel and slander.69
Prosser's four-part formulation of invasion of privacy was codified
in the Restatement and achieved its modem form in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in 1977.70 Following Prosser, the Restatement ad-
dressed absolute and conditional privileges to invasion of privacy,
explicitly referring to the rules governing privilege in defamation.7 1
Finally, the Restatement generally limits who may bring an invasion of
privacy suit to a living individual whose privacy has been invaded.72
Today, the vast majority of states which have adopted the tort
through the common-law system either explicitly recognize the four-part
Restatement/Prosser structure or cite it favorably and explicitly recognize
parts of it without rejecting or questioning the others. 73 Several states
67. Id. at 386-87. Prosser identified Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia as states which had adopted invasion of
privacy by 1960. Id.
68. Id. at 389. Prosser argued the torts shared a common name and a few other characteristics,
but should generally be viewed as separate causes of action. Id.
69. Id. at 419-23. Prosser wrote that Warren and Brandeis considered that the privileges of libel
and slander, such as the absolute privilege of a witness, applied to invasion of privacy, and he saw no
reason to doubt their conclusion. Id. at 421. Prosser also noted that while truth would be no defense
for intrusion, disclosure or appropriation, it may suffice against a false light claim. Id. at 419-20.
70. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 652. This section states:
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting
harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in § 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in § 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in § 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public, as
stated in § 652E.
Id.
71. Id. §§ 652F-652G. Sections 652F and 652G hold that the rules on absolute, conditional and
special privileges for defamation "apply to the publication of any matter that is an invasion of
privacy." Id.
72. Id. at § 6521. The one exception is appropriation, which may survive the death of the
plaintiff because it protects a quasi-property right. Id.
73. The states which roughly employ the four-part structure, either from the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977) or Prosser's article, are: Alabama (Norris v. Muskin Stores, 132 So.
2d 321, 323 (Ala. 1961)); Alaska (Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1137
(Alaska 1989)); Arizona (Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 787-88 (Ariz.
1989)); Arkansas (Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 937 S.W.2d 653, 657 (Ark. 1997)); California (Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 647 (Cal. 1994)); Colorado (Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v.
162 [VOL. 75:155
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generally accept the Restatement structure but either explicitly reject or
seriously question either or both disclosure or false light, the third and
fourth branches of the Restatement's four-part structure.
74
Several states have adopted some form of invasion of privacy by
statute. New York and Virginia maintain the original New York model
of a statute creating a cause of action only for appropriation. 75 Nebras-
ka and Rhode Island have codified the entire Restatement.76 Wisconsin
has codified the Restatement with the exception of false light. 7 7
Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 377 (Colo. 1997)); Connecticut (Goodrich v. Waterbury
Republican-American, 448 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Conn. 1982)); Delaware (Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Corp.,
Inc., 652 A.2d 578, 595 (Del. 1994)); the District of Columbia (Vassiliades v. Garfinckles, Brooks
Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. 1985)); Georgia (Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 409 S.E.2d
835, 836 (Ga. 1991)); Hawaii (Mehau v. Reed, 869 P.2d 1320, 1330 (Haw. 1994)); Idaho (Peterson v.
Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 287 (Idaho 1961)); Illinois (Lovgren v. Citizen's First Nat'l Bank
of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 988-89 (Il1. 1989)); Iowa (Anderson v. Low Cost Housing Comm'n, 304
N.W.2d 239, 248 (Iowa 1981)); Kansas (Dotson v. McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1, 6 (Kan. 1975)); Kentucky
(McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky. 1981)); Louisiana
(Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (La. 1979)); Maine (Berthaiume's Estate
v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 794-95 (Me. 1976)); Maryland (Household Fin. Corp. v. Bridge, 250 A.2d 878,
881-82 (Md. 1969)); Michigan (Swickard v. Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 310
(Mich. 1991)); Mississippi (Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publ'g Co., 326 So. 2d 471, 473 (Miss. 1976));
Montana (State Bd. of Dentistry v. Kandarian, 886 P.2d 954, 957-58 (Mont. 1994)); Nevada
(Montesana v. Donrey Media Group, 668 P.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Nev. 1985)); New Hampshire
(Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (N.H. 1964)); New Mexico (Andrews v. Stallings, 892
P.2d 611, 625 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)); New Jersey (Rumbauskas v. Carter, 649 A.2d 853, 856-57 (N.J.
1994)); Oregon (Mouri v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 309-10 (Or. 1996)); Pennsylvania (Curran v. Children
Serv. Ctr. of Wyoming County, Inc., 578 A.2d 8, 12-13 (Pa. 1990)); South Dakota (Truxes v. Kenco
Enters., Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914, 917 (S.D. 1963)); Tennessee (Martin v. Senators, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 660,
662-63 (Tenn. 1967)); Vermont (Staruski v. Continental Tel. Co. of Vt., 581 A.2d 266, 268 (Vt. 1990));
and West Virginia (Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., Inc., 485 S.E.2d 391, 404 (W. Va. 1997)).
74. Generally, states which reject disclosure or false light cite potential overlap with defamation,
as well as First Amendment concerns. See generally Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231,
235 (Minn. 1998) (declining to recognize false light because of similarity to existing defamation
provisions). Other states which do not recognize false light are Missouri (Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broad.,
709 S.W.2d 475, 480-81 (Mo. 1986) (questioning and declining to recognize false light)); Ohio (M.J.
DiCarpo v. Sweeney, 634 N.E.2d 203, 210 (Ohio 1994) (declining to recognize false light)); South
Carolina (Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., Inc., 383 S.E.2d 2, 5 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (listing
intrusion, appropriation, and disclosure as actionable invasion of privacy torts)); and Texas (Cain v.
Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994) (rejecting false light)). Indiana has rejected disclosure,
Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997), and North Carolina rejects both false light
and disclosure, Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711, 714 (N.C. 1988) (recognizing only intrusion and
appropriation).
75. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-.40 (Michie
1992). Both statutes prohibit use of another's name for "purposes of trade" or "advertising purposes."
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-.40.
76. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-201 to -211 (1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1997).
77. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997).
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Florida, 78 Oklahoma, 79 and Utah80 have appropriation statutes but also
recognize common law suits.
Two states, Massachusetts and Washington, defy easy categorization.
Massachusetts has a statute generally affirming protection of a right of
privacy against unreasonable intrusion, which its courts have applied with
reference to, but without explicitly recognizing, the Restatement.81 Wash-
ington has a statute protecting privacy against surreptitious recording. 82
Its cases have mentioned but never applied the common-law formulation
of invasion of privacy. 83 Only two states, North Dakota and Wyoming,
have no cases or statutes recognizing at least some kind of a tort action
for invasion of privacy. 84
Until July 1998, when Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. was decided, 85
Minnesota stood with North Dakota and Wyoming in terms of states with-
out invasion of privacy torts. 86 The plaintiffs were two young women
who had delivered film of their vacation to Wal-Mart for development.87
Wal-Mart developed the majority of the photos, but indicated that some
of them could not be processed because of their "nature." 88 The
plaintiffs later discovered that the roll included a photo of them naked
together in the shower.89 Wal-Mart employees had in fact developed and
78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1997). Florida's statute explicitly outlaws disclosure, and
specifically allows courts to hear common law privacy suits. Id.
79. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839 (West 1983); McCormack v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 613 P.2d
737, 740 (Okla. 1980) (recognizing common law invasion of privacy actions in addition to those
actions created by statute).
80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-1 to -6 (1993). Utah's statute, designed to prevent what it calls
"abuse of personal identity," also allows common law suits, § 45-3-6, but its courts have yet to
recognize them. Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563-64 (Utah 1988) (considering but declining to
recognize, on facts presented, common law privacy torts).
81. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § IB (West 1989); Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113,
120-21 (Mass. 1985) (applying statute with reference to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652
(1977)).
82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.010 - .140 (1998).
83. See Doe v. Group Health Co-op of Puget Sound, Inc., 932 P.2d 178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(considering but declining to recognize, on the facts presented, common law invasion of privacy torts).
84. Hougum recently reaffirmed North Dakota's lack of an invasion of privacy tort. See
Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 1998 N.D. 24, 24, 574 N.W.2d 812, 818. The Wyoming courts
have never analyzed a common-law invasion of privacy claim, and there are no statutes in Wyoming
concerning invasion of privacy. Cf. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn.
1998) (identifying Wyoming and North Dakota as the only states without invasion of privacy).
85. 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).
86. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234-35 (Minn. 1998) (recognizing invasion
of privacy and identifying North Dakota and Wyoming as the only states which do not recognize any
privacy torts).
87. Id. at 233. The women brought pictures of a trip to Mexico to the Wal-Mart in Dilworth,
Minnesota. Id.
88. Id. The photos included a note indicating that several had not been developed. Id.
89. Id. at 232. The plaintiffs claimed the picture was taken by a friend as one of the plaintiffs
was exiting and the other entering the shower. Brief for the Appellant at 1, Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998) (No. C7-97-263).
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copied this picture, and had circulated copies in the community.90 Plain-
tiffs sued, alleging all four forms of invasion of privacy, none of which
Minnesota had previously recognized. 91 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, the appeals court affirmed, and the
plaintiffs appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court.92
Recognizing the power that the judicial system has in helping the
law evolve, the court briefly discussed the history of invasion of
privacy. 93 Notably, it also described the question as one of first impres-
sion, characterizing its previous discussions of the issue as dicta.94 The
Minnesota Supreme Court then held that Minnesota would recognize
invasion of privacy based on the Restatement, but declined to address the
merits of the case, writing only that the plaintiffs stated a claim sufficient
to survive summary judgment. 95 The court then remanded the case for
trial.96
North Dakota first addressed invasion of privacy in a tort context in
the 1970 case of Volk v. Auto-Dine Corp.97 Plaintiff sued for appropria-
tion, claiming that the defendant used her name in an advertisement
without her permission. 98 The court noted that the trial court found that
the plaintiff consented to the use of her name by the defendant.99 Thus,
as it would do again in its discussion of the issue, the court held that it
was unnecessary to decide whether North Dakota would recognize
invasion of privacy, because even assuming it did, the plaintiff had failed
to state a sufficient claim.100
90. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 233.
91. See id. The opinion asserted that whether Minnesota should recognize invasion of privacy
was a question of first impression. Id. Additionally, the court noted in a footnote that Minnesota had
previously only dealt with the issue "tangentially, in dicta." Id. at n. 1.
92. See id. The district court granted summary judgment because Minnesota did not recognize
invasion of privacy; the court of appeals affirmed for the same reason. Id.
93. See id. at 234-35. Two justices joined a dissenting opinion which disagreed that it was the
court's role to decide whether Minnesota should have invasion of privacy torts, arguing that such
decisions should be left to the legislature. See id. at 236-37.
94. Id. at 233.
95. Id. at 234-35. The court noted that the naked body is a very private part of one's person and
as such constitutes a privacy interest worthy of protection. Id. Additionally, the court declined to
recognize false light. Id. at 235.
96. Id. As of publication, the case has not yet proceeded to trial on remand.
97. 177 N.W.2d 525 (N.D. 1970).
98. Volk v. Auto-Dine Corp., 177 N.W.2d 525, 526-27 (N.D. 1970). The plaintiff's claims also
included breach of contract. Id. at 526. Although the plaintiff claimed simply invasion of privacy
generally and not appropriation, the privacy claim would generally meet the elements of that branch
of the tort. Id.
99. Id. at 528. The suit arose from Volk's assertion that she allowed Auto-Dine to use her recipe
for cole slaw, and advertise the cole slaw as "Mother Volk's Cole Slaw," but that Auto-Dine failed to
pay her as it had agreed. Id. at 527.
100. Id. at 529. In addition to rejecting the invasion of privacy claim, the court reversed the
summary judgment on the contract claim and remanded for trial. Id. at 530.
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The court next addressed the issue eleven years later, in City of
Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, Inc.101 The City of Grand Forks
was appealing a judgment ordering it to allow the Grand Forks Herald to
inspect the personnel file of a former police chief.102 Therefore, the case
did not involve a tort claim. 103 One argument advanced by the city was
that allowing the inspection would constitute an impermissible invasion
of the police chief's privacy.104 The court rejected the claim that an
"informational right of privacy" existed, and noted in a footnote that
North Dakota had not yet permitted tort claims for invasion of
privacy.105
One year later, in American Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Jordan,106
the court addressed the issue more directly. 107 The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant had used his name in a testimonial for its company
without authorization.1 0 8  The trial court dismissed this portion of the
claim on the ground that the tort did not yet exist in North Dakota.109
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the
lower court found as a fact that the plaintiff granted the defendant
permission to use his name, there could be no claim even if the tort
existed.I 1o
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also recently addressed the
stance of the North Dakota court in Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.1 1 1
The plaintiff claimed that his privacy had been invaded when his em-
101. 307 N.W.2d 572 (N.D. 1981).
102. City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, Inc., 307 N.W.2d 572, 573 (N.D. 1981). The
Grand Forks Herald sought access to the personnel file of former police chief S.D. Knutson when
Knutson became a candidate for county commissioner of Grand Forks County. Id. at 573-74. The city
refused, and it subsequently sought a declaratory judgment that the contents of personnel files were
not public records. Id. at 574. The trial court rejected the city's arguments, and the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 574, 579. Thus, the court held that the records were open to the
public. Id. at 578.
103. Id. at 574. Rather, the privacy issue arose in the context of a claim for a declaratory
judgment that city personnel files are open to the public. Id. at 573.
104. See id. at 578. The court phrased the privacy argument thus: "Knutson asserts that a right of
informational privacy exists under both the Federal and the State Constitutions which would prevent
the disclosure of the contents of his personnel file." Id.
105. See id. at 578-79, 579 n.3 (rejecting informational privacy claim and noting North Dakota
had not determined whether to permit invasion of privacy claims).
106. 315 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1982).
107. American Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 315 N.W.2d 290, 295-96 (N.D. 1982). Unlike City
of Grand Forks, the court in American Mutual Life discussed a claim for the appropriation branch of
invasion of privacy. Id.; see also City of Grand Forks, 307 N.W.2d at 578-79 (discussing the
disclosure of contents of personnel files).
108. See American Mut. Life, 315 N.W.2d at 295. American Mutual sued Jordan to recover
damages resulting from his sales of insurance to third parties on behalf of the company. See id. at
291-93. Jordan subsequently counterclaimed for appropriation. Id. at 291.
109. See id. (reviewing the procedural history of case).
110. See id. at 296. The court also found that the trial court's determination that the plaintiff had
given consent was not clearly erroneous. Id.
111. 70 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 1995).
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ployer opened his locked desk.112 The district court dismissed the claim
because North Dakota had never recognized such an action. 113 In
affirming the judgment, the court noted that North Dakota had declined
on several occasions to recognize privacy claims.11 4 The court wrote,
"[T]his studied reluctance does not bode well for the acceptance of this
kind of cause of action in North Dakota in the future." 115 This predic-
tion has thus far been proven correct, as illustrated by the fact that the
North Dakota Supreme Court in Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes1
16
rejected the next invasion of privacy claim it heard.117
III. ANALYSIS
In Hougum, the North Dakota Supreme Court provided its most
detailed analysis of a privacy claim to date."l 8 Justice Neumann, writing
for a unanimous court, used the Restatement's formulation for intrusion
upon seclusion throughout the opinion.119 An analysis of the issues was
possible because the court again "assum[ed] without deciding" that a
claim for invasion of privacy existed in North Dakota. 120 Under that
formulation, the elements of intrusion upon seclusion are: 1) an inten-
tional intrusion by the defendant; 2) into a matter the plaintiff has a right
to keep private; and 3) which is objectionable to a reasonable person.121
The court further identified what it called "two primary factors for
analyzing a claim for intrusion upon seclusion: 1) the means used for
the intrusion; and 2) the defendant's purpose for obtaining the
112. Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 70 F.3d 962, 966-67 (8th Cir. 1995). The invasion claim was
only one of several by the plaintiff; the others included age discrimination, retaliatory discharge,
disability discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. Id. at 964.
113. Id. at 966-67.
114. Id. at 967 (referring to Volk, Jordan, and City of Grand Forks).
115. Id.
116. 1998 N.D. 24, 574 N.W.2d 812.
117. See Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, 1998 N.D. 24, 24, 574 N.W.2d 812, 818
(rejecting plaintiff s unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion claim).
118. See id. in 9-24, 574 N.W.2d 816-18. In comparison, the court spent only one paragraph on
invasion of privacy in Volk, four in City of Grand Forks, and five in American Mut. Life. See
American Mut. Life Ins. Co., v. Jordan, 315 N.W.2d 290, 295-96 (N.D. 1982); City of Grand Forks v.
Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d 572, 578-79 (N.D. 1981); Volk v. Auto-Dine Corp., 177 N.W.2d
525, 529 (N.D. 1970).
119. See Hougum, 9-10, 574 N.W.2d at 816 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF ToRTS § 652
(1977)). While the court was unanimous in its discussion of Hougum's claim against Sears and Moran,
Chief Justice VandeWalle dissented from its discussion of Hougum's claim against Valley Memorial
Homes. Id. 50, 574 N.W.2d at 822.
120. Id. I 13, 574 N.W.2d at 816. The court employed a similar strategy in Volk and American
Mut. Life, in which it held that specific claims could not go forward even if a general claim for
invasion was recognized. See Volk, 177 N.W.2d at 529;American Mut. Life, 315 N.W.2d at 295-96
(holding that the facts would fail to state a sufficient claim even if invasion of privacy was
recognized).
121. See Hougum, 14, 574 N.W.2d at 816-17 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §
652A (1977)).
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information." 122 These factors do not take the place of the three
elements of an intrusion claim under the Restatement; rather, the court
uses them as tools for evaluating the application of the Restatement
elements to the facts of this case. 123 The court drew these factors from a
text by Keeton and Prosser, which Hougum did address, and which
Moran and Sears cited, but not for these factors.124 Further, none of the
cases the court reviewed explicitly mentions the factors. 125 Despite this,
however, the court stressed these factors and structured its analysis
around them. 126
The court began by noting that invasion of privacy cases involving
public restrooms usually include a planned intrusion accomplished
through the use of equipment or surreptitious observation. 127 The court
then briefly discussed four of these cases, each of which illustrated the
trend the court had identified.1 28 Although it did not explicitly cite
them, the court's discussion of these cases emphasized the two primary
factors it identified earlier as crucial in analyzing intrusion claims, the
method of the intrusion, and the reason for it.129
122. Id. (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 117, at 856
(5th ed. 1984)).
123. See generally Hougum, 16-24, 574 N.w.2d at 817-18. The court wrote that the
"viability" of cases it reviewed depended on the two factors, and applied them to determine whether
the intrusion in this case was objectionable to a reasonable person. Id. 1 20, 574 N.W.2d at 818.
124. See Brief of Appellant at 10, Hougum (No. 970108) (citing the rule from the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)); see also Brief of Appellees at 10, Hougum (No. 970108) (citing a
different page of the Prosser & Keeton text than that from which the court drew the two factors).
125. See cases cited infra note 167.
126. See Hougum, 16-24, 574 N.W.2d at 817-18 (stating that the "viability" of cases reviewed
by the court depends on the factors and employing them throughout discussion).
127. Id. 1 15, 574 N.W.2d at 817. The court cited five cases and an A.L.R. annotation. Id. A
review of case law suggests the court's assertion is generally accurate. See generally Carter v.
Innisfree Hotel, Inc., 661 So. 2d 1174, 1179 (Ala. 1995) (basing an intrusion claim on a see-through
mirror in a hotel bathroom); New Summit Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Nistle, 533 A.2d 1350, 1354 (Md.
1987) (predicating claim on see-through mirror in apartment). Further, Hougum's brief did not cite
any authority indicating otherwise, relying instead on a series of criminal cases which discuss privacy
in a public restroom in a search and seizure context. See Brief of Appellant at 12-16, Hougum (No.
970108) (citing criminal cases to support argument for privacy in a public restroom). Some of these
same cases were cited favorably by the district court judge in his memorandum decision granting
summary judgment. See Hougum v. Valley Memorial Homes, Civil No. 96-981 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Feb.
25, 1997) (mem.) (citing favorably several criminal cases involving privacy in a public restroom, and
describing one as "persuasive"). In their brief, Sears and Moran argued that these criminal cases did
not control in this case, and the North Dakota Supreme Court did not mention any of them in its
analysis. See Brief of Appellee at 11, Hougum (No. 970108) (arguing that criminal precedent does
not control); see also Hougum, 11 15-24, 574 N.W.2d at 817-818 (analyzing the case without citing
criminal cases briefed by the plaintiff).
128. Hougum, 16-19, 574 N.W.2d at 817-18 (discussing Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Kjerstad v.
Ravalette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1994); Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 339 N.W.2d
857 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)).
129. See generally id. 16, 574 N.W.2d at 817 (discussing Harkey in terms of the two key
factors, the means used for intrusion and the reason for intrusion).
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In Harkey v. Abate, 130 the first case the court discussed, the plain-
tiffs were patrons of a roller rink who alleged that the owner had in-
stalled see-through panels in the ceiling of a bathroom.1 31 They sued
for intrusion upon seclusion; the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendant, and the Michigan Court of Appeals
reversed. 132 In its discussion of Harkey, the North Dakota Supreme
Court noted that the Michigan court found the plaintiffs had a right to
privacy in a public restroom which the defendant violated. 133 However,
the court emphasized that it was the installation of hidden viewing
devices that led the Michigan court to conclude that the invasion was one
which a reasonable person would find highly offensive. 134 In an implicit
reference to the two factors it identified earlier as instrumental in
analyzing intrusion upon seclusion claims, the court wrote that the means
of invasion in Harkey showed an intentional effort to intrude upon anoth-
er's privacy, and that there was no legitimate purpose for doing S0.135
Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 136 the second case discussed by the
court, arose when store patrons complained of homosexual activity in the
store's restrooms. 137 Members of the store's staff, positioned above the
stall, observed an individual engaging in homosexual acts; and he was
subsequently arrested and pled guilty to criminal sodomy.138 When he
sued the store for intrusion upon seclusion, the court entered summary
judgment against him, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed. 139
While the Georgia court found, as did the Michigan court, that the
plaintiff had a right to privacy in a public restroom, it held that this
interest was not absolute.1 40 In this instance, the North Dakota court
noted that the privacy interest was outweighed by the store's interest in
providing crime-free restrooms, an interest implicated by the fact that
sufficient cause existed to believe that homosexual acts were occurring in
130. 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
131. Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). The plaintiff in Harkey
alleged that the defendant observed her and her daughter as they used the restroom. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Hougum, 16, 574 N.W.2d at 817 (discussing Harkey, 346 N.w.2d at 76).
134. Id.
135. Id. The Michigan court which wrote Harkey did not refer at any point to the defendant's
purpose in installing the viewing devices. Harkey, 346 N.W.2d 75-77.
136. 341 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
137. Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
138. Id. The employees were in a storage area above the bathroom, where a crack in the stalls'
ceiling allowed them to look into the restroom below. Id.
139. Id. at 905, 907.
140. See id. at 906. The opinion, written by a Georgia court, cites extensively from Pavesich, in
part for the proposition that, "the law recognizes that the right of privacy is not absolute." Id. (quoting
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905)).
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the bathroom. 141 This provided a legitimate reason for the search,
making it reasonable and satisfying the two key factors.142
The plaintiff in the third case, Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 143
sued a retail store, alleging intrusion based on an employee's observa-
tion of him while he was in a fitting room. 144 The fitting room had signs
indicating that it would be monitored by store personnel. 145 The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendant,
recognizing that the right of privacy was subordinate to other rights,
including those that spring from business relationships. 146 In this case,
the court found two facts combined to make the intrusion reasonable. 147
First, the signs in the room diminished the plaintiff's expectation of
privacy.1 48 Second, observation by store security staff who were the
same sex as the plaintiff was not unreasonable.149 Therefore, the busi-
ness relationship provided a legitimate reason for the intrusion, and the
means were not unreasonable, fulfilling the two primary factors.150
The final case, Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 151 received
very short treatment from the court. 152 The defendant used a vacant
room next to a restroom to observe female employees. 153 The court in
Kjerstad affirmed the trial court's decision to submit the invasion of
privacy question to the jury.154 While the North Dakota Supreme Court
merely mentions these facts, an application of the two factors would
presumably show that there was no legitimate reason for the intrusion,
and that the means used were objectionable.155
141. See Hougum, 17, 574 N.W.2d at 817. The North Dakota Supreme Court read Elmore as
holding that the intrusion was reasonable as a matter of law since it was not for the purpose of
personally invading privacy. Id.
142. See id. As in the Harkey discussion, the court did not expressly mention the two key factors
in its discussion of Elmore. Id.
143. 339 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
144. Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 339 N.W.2d 857, 858 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 859. The Michigan court relied upon an earlier Michigan case for this holding. Id.
(citing Earp v. Detroit, 167 N.W.2d 841 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)).
147. Hougum, 18, 574 N.W.2d at 817-18 (analyzing the facts of Lewis)
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Again, the court did not explicitly mention the two factors in its discussion. Id.
151. 517 N.W.2d 419 (S.D. 1994).
152. Hougum, 19, 574 N.W.2d at 818. The court devoted only two sentences to Kjerstad. Id.
153. See id. (reviewing the facts of Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d. 419,
421-22 (S.D. 1994).
154. Id. The jury had found for the plaintiffs. See Kjerstad, 517 N.W.2d at 424.
155. See Hougum, 19, 574 N.W.2d at 818. The court did not analyze Kjerstadin detail, but an
application of the two factors is consistent with the court's statement that the viability of the cases it
discussed depends on the factors. Id. 20 (discussing the relationship between the two primary
factors and the cases it discussed). Further, the conclusion that the factors would support the plaintiffs




After reviewing these cases, the court drew two conclusions about
intrusion cases centering on public restrooms. 156 First, the court con-
cluded that while all the cases recognize a privacy interest which exists in
a public restroom, they also acknowledge that the privacy interest is not
absolute. 157 Second, the court asserted that the intrusion cases' "viabili-
ty generally turns" on the two factors it identified earlier: the purpose
for the intrusion and whether the method of surveillance would be
objectionable to the reasonable person.158
Applying these two factors to the facts of Hougum, the court turned
first to the means employed to accomplish the intrusion. 159 The court
noted that there was no evidence that Moran or Sears drilled the hole
through which Moran observed Hougum, and that there was evidence
that Sears had covered the hole with a metal plate, but that the plate had
been removed by "unknown persons."1 60 Moran testified that he
thought the bathroom was unoccupied when he entered, and that he
noticed Hougum inadvertently when he bent down to get toilet paper. 161
Hougum characterized Moran's actions as deliberate and intentional, but
the court noted that he pointed to nothing in the record supporting this
view and contradicting Moran's version.162
The court summarized these facts by stating that the observation was
limited in time and scope, and was neither recorded nor seen by
others.163 Thus, the court determined that the means of the intrusion in
this case were not unreasonable or offensive, since they were not inten-
tional.164 The court also emphasized that Moran's brief visual inspec-
tion was consistent with his work duties, because as a Sears employee he
was not required to ignore the possibility of vandalism or shoplifting
occurring in a stall he had believed to be unoccupied.1 65 Therefore, the




160. Id. In their brief, Sears and Moran asserted that "Sears had, on several occasions, blocked
the opening by covering it with metal plates riveting or screwing them securely in place," but that
"unknown users of the restroom" removed the covers. See Brief of Appellees at 2, Hougum (No.
970108). The court did not cite the brief, but its mention of "unidentified persons" seems to indicate it
relied on the appellee's statements. See id.
161. See Hougum, 21, 574 N.W.2d at 818. Moran further testified that he could see Hougum
without putting his eye directly to the hole. Id.162. See id. 22. The court pointed to Hougum's characterizations of Moran's actions as a
"deliberate visual inspection" and an "intentional and direct observation." Id.
163. Id. 24 (holding reasonable persons could only conclude the inspection was not by a
method reasonable persons would find offensive).
164. See id. 123.
165. See id. (citing Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986)
(recognizing a store's interest in a crime-free restroom)). Although it is not entirely clear on this
point, the court most likely meant that a brief visual inspection is consistent with work duties only after
an employee has observed unusual activity in an unusual place, not that there is a general duty to look
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reason for the intrusion, after the accidental discovery, was presumably
legitimate.166 The court therefore held, as a matter of law, that Hougum
had not stated a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, and thus
summary judgment had been properly granted.167
Throughout, the court's analysis focused on the two factors, and it
did not explicitly discuss the Restatement elements of intrusion: 1) an
intentional intrusion by the defendant; 2) into a matter the plaintiff has a
right to keep private; and 3) which is objectionable to a reasonable
person.168 However, its discussion of other cases and the two factors
essentially implicated these elements.169
First, the discussion of the means used for the intrusion roughly
corresponds in this case to the element of intent.170 The court found that
the means were not offensive to the reasonable person, a finding predi-
cated on Moran's statements that the intrusion was unplanned and inad-
vertent. 171 There was, therefore, no intentional intrusion, and thus the
first element of an intrusion claim was not satisfied.172
The court's discussion also implicated the second element of an
intrusion claim, that the intrusion must be into an area the plaintiff has a
right to keep private. 173 In reviewing three of the cases, the court noted
that while there is a right to privacy in a public restroom, it is a qualified
right which may be abrogated by other rights and interests. 174 One such
countervailing interest the court mentioned explicitly is that of a store in
maintaining crime-free restrooms, an interest which justified Moran's
brief inspection. 175 Therefore, the second element of an intrusion claim
was missing: While the plaintiff had a general, limited right to privacy in
a restroom, the right did not prevail in this case against this defendant.176
in restrooms. See id. (stating that a brief visual inspection was consistent with Moran's work duties).
Such a "duty" would likely qualify as a "planned or continued pattern of observation of private
matters in a restroom," which the court distinguished from the facts of this case. Id.
166. See id. (finding intrusion was consistent with the employee's duty to prevent possible
shoplifting or vandalism).
167. Id. 1 24 (affirming the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the plaintiffs intrusion upon seclusion claim).
168. See id. 14, 574 N.W.2d 816-17 (listing the elements of an intrusion claim and framing the
discussion in terms of the key elements).
169. See id. 24, 574 N.W.2d at 818 (affirming summary judgment after reviewing cases and
key factors).
170. See id. 21 (finding nothing to contradict Moran's testimony that the intrusion was
unplanned and, at least initially, inadvertent).
171. Id.
172. See id. 14, 574 N.W.2d at 816-17 (listing intent as an element of intrusion upon seclusion).
173. See id. (listing the elements of intrusion upon seclusion).
174. See id. 16-18, 574 N.W.2d at 817 (citing Harkey, Lewis and Kerstad for the proposition
that the right to privacy in a public restroom is not absolute).
175. Id. [ 23, 574 N.W.2d at 818 (citing Lewis and Kjerstad for the proposition that stores have an
interest in crime-free bathrooms and stating that Moran's brief inspection was consistent with his
duties as a loss-prevention employee).
176. See id. (finding an inspection consistent with Moran's work duties).
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Finally, the court specifically found that the third element, that the
intrusion must be highly offensive to a reasonable person, was not
met. 177 This conclusion seemed to be in part based on the fact the intru-
sion was not accomplished through use of surreptitious means or
equipment.178 Rather, Moran claimed that the intrusion was inadvertent,
and Hougum could not show any facts disproving this claim. 179 There-
fore, the final element of intrusion was not met. 180
Therefore, the court's analysis dealt in some fashion with each of
the elements of an intrusion claim under the Restatement.181 However,
its focus is clearly on the two analytical factors it identified for assessing
intrusion claims.182 While the court emphasized these factors, however,
none of the cases the court reviewed mentions them.183 Rather, these
cases relied on prior state law. 184 Further, the plaintiff did not make any
mention of the two factors, relying instead completely on the
Restatement.185 Moran and Sears cited the text from which the court
drew the factors, but did not actually mention them. 186 The court relied
on these factors in its analysis, however, and it held that Hougum had
failed to state a sufficient claim for intrusion upon seclusion, even if such
a claim were recognized in North Dakota.187
IV. IMPACT
The holding in Hougum was an affirmation of a summary judg-
ment, granted by the trial court in keeping with established precedent.188
As such, it did not declare new law or change existing rules. 189 However,
177. See id. 24 (finding, as a matter of law, that the intrusion was not objectionable to a
reasonable person).
178. See id. 23 (distinguishing the case from Harkey and Kjerstad on the ground that no
equipment was used to accomplish the invasion).
179. See id. 21 (finding nothing to contradict Moran's testimony that the intrusion was
unplanned and, at least initially, inadvertent).
180. See id. 24 (finding the intrusion was not objectionable to a reasonable person).
181. See id. (affirming summary judgment after reviewing cases and key factors).
182. See id. 20, 574 N.W.2d at 818 (stating the "viability" of restroom cases depends on the
two factors).
183. See Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 75-76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Michigan
precedent); Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 906 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Georgia
precedent); Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 339 N.W.2d 857, 859-60 (Mich Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Michigan precedent); Kjerstad v. Ravalette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 424 (S.D. 1994)
(citing South Dakota precedent).
184. See cases cited supra note 183.
185. See Brief of Appellant at 10, Hougum (No. 970108) (citing the rule from the RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652A (1965)).
186. See Brief of Appellees at 10, Hougum (No. 970108) (citing a different page of Prosser &
Keeton text than that from which the court drew the two factors).
187. See Hougum, 24, 574 N.W.2d at 818 (affirming summary judgment against the plaintiff).
188. Id.
189. Id.
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the format and detail of the court's analysis may suggest several possi-
bilities for the future of invasion of privacy torts in North Dakota, most
notably because the court performed its first detailed analysis of an
intrusion claim, and used the Restatement format for the first time.190
The decision also affirms that the North Dakota Supreme Court, if it
does eventually recognize invasion of privacy, will not do so until a case
states sufficient facts to force it to make a decision.X91
First, Hougum is by far the most detailed discussion of an invasion
of privacy claim by the North Dakota Supreme Court. 192 The court had
not previously given more than five paragraphs to a discussion of an
invasion of privacy tort claim. 193 This may be due in part to the nature
of Hougum's intrusion upon seclusion claim, which is factually the most
invasive case to date.194 Further, the trial courts in Volk and American
Mutual Life Insurance Company predicated their decisions on the lack of
an element, the lack of which had been clearly established in the
record.1 95 In both cases, therefore, its reliance on lower court findings
meant that the North Dakota Supreme Court was not required to perform
a complete analysis.196
The Hougum decision also rested in large part on a determination
that the record did not substantiate Hougum's claim that Moran's
inspection was intentional, and Hougum's failure on appeal to overcome
Moran's consistent assertion that it was inadvertent.1 97 Thus, the court
might have relied on this fact and, as it had in the past, could have
quickly disposed of the issue. 198 Yet the court performed a detailed
190. Cf id. N 9-24, 574 N.W.2d at 816-18 (discussing an invasion of privacy claim using the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)).
191. Cf. id. 13, 24, 574 N.W.2d at 816, 818 (beginning discussion by assuming without deciding
that an invasion claim exists in North Dakota and, after analysis, affirming summary judgment against
the plaintiff and declining to recognize invasion of privacy).
192. Compare id. 9H 9-24, 574 N.W.2d at 816-18 (devoting 16 paragraphs to discussion of
invasion claim) with Volk v. Auto-Dine Corp., 177 N.W.2d 525, 529 (N.D. 1970) (devoting two
paragraphs to invasion claim), City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d 572, 578-79
(N.D. 1981) (discussing invasion of privacy for four paragraphs), American Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Jordan, 315 N.W.2d 290, 295-96 (N.D. 1982) (giving five paragraphs to privacy claim).
193. See American Mut. Life, 315 N.W.2d at 295-96.
194. Compare Hougum, IN 2-4, 574 N.W.2d at 815 (reviewing facts underlying intrusion claim)
with Volk, 177 N.W.2d at 526-27 and American. Mut. Life, 315 N.W.2d at 295 (discussing facts of
appropriation claims).
195. See Volk, 177 N.W.2d at 529 (dismissing a claim based on the plaintiffs admission, in a
deposition, that she consented to the use of her name by the defendant), see also American. Mut. Life,
315 N.W.2d at 295-96 (basing affirmation of summary judgment on a lower court finding that the
plaintiff consented to the use of his name).
196. See cases cited supra note 195.
197. See Hougum, 22, 574 N.W.2d at 818. The court asserted that Hougum did not meet the
burden incumbent on a party resisting summary judgment, which is either to present competent
evidence or demonstrate from the record that there is a disputed issue of material fact. Id.
198. Cf. id. (analyzing the case despite finding that the plaintiff had failed at the trial court to
establish an element of his claim); see also Volk, 177 N.W.2d at 529 (dismissing the claim based on the
[VOL. 75:155
1999] CASE COMMENT
analysis on the facts of the case. 199 As noted, this may reflect a distinc-
tion between Hougum and prior cases concerning the extent to which the
plaintiff's privacy was invaded and the subsequent effects of the
invasion. 200 It may also, however, reflect a willingness on the part of the
court to entertain in detail invasion of privacy claims.20 1
Also for the first time, the court explicitly employed the Restate-
ment formulation of the tort.202 This is due, in large part, to the fact that
the plaintiff pleaded his case according to the Restatement.203 This is not
surprising since the majority of states that have recognized common law
invasion of privacy have employed this standard, and thus the majority
of case law is devoted to claims predicated on it.204
However, in its three previous discussions of invasion of privacy, the
North Dakota Supreme Court had not explicitly mentioned the Restate-
ment.205 Hougum, therefore, generally brings North Dakota into the ma-
jority of states, at least insofar as its analysis employed the Restatement
elements for intrusion upon seclusion. 206 Thus, the decision seems to
indicate that any future common law invasion of privacy has in North
Dakota lies in the Restatement.207
The court in Hougum also relied heavily on the two factors identi-
fied by Prosser and Keeton for use in analyzing intrusion upon seclusion
claims, the means used for the intrusion and the reason for it.208 While
its use of the Restatement was dictated in part by the plaintiff's claim, 209
the use of these factors was not since neither party had briefed them, and
none of the cases on which the court relied mentions them. 2 10 There is
plaintiff's admission, in a deposition, that she consented to the use of her name by the defendant).
199. See Hougum, 9-24, 574 N.W.2d at 816-18 (analyzing the plaintiff's claim for 16
paragraphs despite the fact that the plaintiff failed to show evidence in the record that the invasion
was intentional, a required element of an intrusion claim).
200. See id. 2-6, 574 N.W.2d at 815 (reviewing the facts of the case, including the initial
discovery of Hougum, his arrest and the subsequent loss of his job).
201. Cf. id. H 9-24, 574 N.W.2d at 816-18 (devoting 16 paragraphs to an analysis of the invasion
claim, the first such detailed analysis by the North Dakota Supreme Court).
202. See id. 10-11, 574 N.w.2d at 816 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A
(1977)); see also Volk, 177 N.W.2d at 529 (citing Am. Jur. and C.J.S. articles); City of Grand Forks v.
Grand Forks Herald, 307 N.W.2d 572, 578-79 (N.D. 1981) (citing several non-tort U.S. Supreme
Court cases); American Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 315 N.W.2d 290, 295-96 (N.D. 1982) (rejecting
a claim without citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977)).
203. See Hougum, 1 9, 574 N.W.2d at 816.
204. See cases cited supra note 73 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 201.
206. See Hougum, 91 9-24, 574 N.W.2d at 816-18 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
652 (1977)).
207. Cf. id. (predicating the discussion of the invasion of privacy claim on application of rules
and principles derived from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977)).
208. See id. 91 20, 574 N.W.2d at 818 (stating that the "viability" of the analyzed cases depended
on the two factors).
209. See id. 1 9, 574 N.W.2d at 816 (reviewing Hougum's claim, which he based on the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977) formulation of invasion of privacy).
210. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
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nothing in the court's analysis to indicate why it relied so heavily on
these factors, and thus no way to know if it will do so again in the
future.2 11
Whether invasion of privacy torts have a future at all in North
Dakota is, however, an open question. 2 12 If they are ultimately recog-
nized, the experience of Minnesota, which only recently recognized
common law invasion of privacy, may provide a model for how it will
happen.2 13 When it first considered the matter in 1975, the Minnesota
court, like the North Dakota court, found it unnecessary to decide
whether to recognize invasion of privacy, because as it found the plain-
tiff had failed to state a sufficient case. 214 In subsequent years, Minneso-
ta courts relied on this strategy to deny claims, 2 15 and appellate courts
sometimes denied them out of hand because the Minnesota Supreme
Court had not recognized invasion of privacy. 216
In Lake, however, the Minnesota court characterized all of its
previous cases as "dicta," asserting that this claim was the first time it
had confronted the issue.2 17 The implication of this assertion seems to
be that this was the first time the court had been presented with facts
which forced it to reach the ultimate issue.218 When confronted with
such a case, the court had little trouble deciding to recognize three of the
four privacy torts.219 Thus, following Minnesota, North Dakota could
characterize its previous decisions as dicta and recognize invasion of
211. Cf Hougum, 14-20, 574 N.W.2d at 817-18 (identifying two key factors, analyzing several
cases in terms of them, and asserting their viability depended on the factors).
212. Id. 13, 574 N.W.2d at 816 (holding that the intrusion claim was insufficient after assuming
without deciding that such a claim exists in North Dakota).
213. See Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) (recognizing
invasion of privacy as an actionable tort 23 years after declining to recognize it).
214. See Hendry v. Conner, 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1975). The plaintiff had based her
claim on the actions of an employee of a hospital's credit department. Id. at 922. The employee, in a
loud voice in a crowded waiting room, told the plaintiff that she could not obtain service because she
had not paid a bill and also referred to her recent bankruptcy. Id. The court held this did not state a
claim because records of bankruptcy are public facts and the announcement to a small number of
people did not constitute publicity. Id. at 923.
215. See generally Robbinsdale Clinic, P.A. v. Pro-Life Action Ministries, 515 N.W.2d 88, 92-93
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding a disclosure claim, if recognized, would fail because the audience was
too small for disclosure to constitute publicity); House v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684,
685 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding the plaintiffs appropriation and intrusion claims, if torts were
recognized, would fail on the merits).
216. See generally Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg. Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(affirming summary judgment because Minnesota had not recognized privacy torts); Markgraf v.
Douglas Corp., 468 N.W.2d 80, 84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (denying the plaintiff's claim because the
supreme court had not recognized invasion of privacy).
217. See Lake, 582 N.W.2d at 233, 233 n.1.
218. Cf. id at 233, 235 (describing the question as one of first impression and, after brief
discussion, holding the plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief may be granted and remanding for
trial).
219. See id. at 235 (recognizing intrusion, disclosure and appropriation after review of the
history of invasion of privacy and a brief review of the plaintiffs' claim).
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privacy when confronted with a compelling claim, which the court
decided Hougum was not.2
20
V. CONCLUSION
In Hougum, the North Dakota Supreme Court provided its first real
analysis of invasion of privacy, using for the first time the
generally-accepted Restatement model. However, it again declined to
recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy because the plaintiff
had not stated a case sufficient to compel it to resolve the issue. 221 The
question, therefore, remains whether North Dakota will recognize inva-
sion of privacy when confronted with a sufficient claim.
Michael S. Raum
220. Cf. id at 233, 235 (describing past discussions as dicta and, after analysis, recognizing
invasion of privacy torts).
221. See Hougum, 124, 574 N.W.2d at 818 (affirming summary judgment).
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